A SOLUTION TO DETECT AND PREVENT WORMHOLE ATTACKS IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK by Tu, Vo Thanh & Ngoc, Luong Thai
Journal of Computer Science and Cybernetics, V.33, N.1 (2017), 1–
DOI: 10.15625/1813-9663/33/1/8914
A SOLUTION TO DETECT AND PREVENT WORMHOLE
ATTACKS IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK
LUONG THAI NGOC1,2, VO THANH TU1
1Faculty of Information Technology, Hue University of Sciences, Hue University
2Faculty of Mathematics and Informatics Teacher Education, Dong Thap University
2ltngoc@dthu.edu.vn; 1vttu@hueuni.edu.vn

Abstract. Wormhole attack is one of varied types of Denial-of-Service attacks in Mobile Ad hoc
Network. For purpose of attack, the attackers use the two malicious nodes connected with each other
by a tunnel that is aimed at eavesdropping or damaging the data packet. Previous researches aiming
at securing against the wormhole attacks were published, typical as detection algorithms based on
round trip time or packet traversal time, or hop-count based analysis. They have the detection
effectiveness is mitigated on the network topology with high mobility nodes, and depends on tunnel
length. This article proposes a valid route testing mechanism (VRTM) and integration of VRTM into
AODV protocol to make DWAODV which is able to detect and prevent the wormhole attacks. Using
Network Simulator (NS2), we evaluate the security effectiveness of DWAODV protocol on random
movement network topology at high speed. The simulation results show that our solution is capable of
detecting successfully over 99% of invalid routes, and small dependence on tunnel length. In addition,
in the normal network topology, the routing performance of DWAODV is approximately as AODV
based on the metrics including the average length of each discovered routing path, packet delivery
ratio, network throughput and routing load.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET [6]) is a collection of wireless mobile nodes without
networking infrastructures, there are no routers or access points. The topology of the network
can change unpredictably and frequently because of nodes exiting or joining. In a MANET,
nodes coordinate together to discover and maintain the routes. The data transfer from a
source node to a destination node can be routed by the means of mediate nodes. A routing
protocol in a MANET specifies how nodes in the network communicate with each other.
It enables the nodes to discover and maintain the routes between any two of them. Many
routing protocols have been developed for MANETs, typical as AODV, DSDV, and ZRP
(see more in [5], Figure 3). They can be classified into three groups: proactive, reactive,
and hybrid routing protocols. For proactive routing protocols, the routes between source
and destination nodes is ready before all data packets can be sent. These protocols are
suitable for fixed topology networks. In contrary, the reactive routing protocols are suitable
for dynamic topology networks as nodes only try to discover routes on demand. In complex
network topologies, the hybrid routing protocols are often used.
c© 2017 Vietnam Academy of Science & Technology
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Routing services at the network layer is one of the goals of denial of service (DoS), in
which a malicious node tries to occupy other nodes resources. Some attack types, such as
Blackhole, Sinkhole, Grayhole, Flooding and Wormhole attacks are types of DoS [16]. The
wormhole attack in Mobile Ad hoc Networks was described by authors in [10]. They have
described several types of wormhole attacks based on the techniques tunnel to route the
packets, such as: wormhole through the tunnel (called out-of-band channel - OB), wormhole
using encapsulation, wormhole using packet relay, wormhole with high power transmission.
Authors [10] described that the wormhole attacks using tunnel may be operated for two
modes of attacks: Hidden Mode (HM) and Participation Mode (PM). In HM, malicious
nodes are hidden from normal nodes, when receive packets and simply forwards them to
each other without process packet, thus, they never appear in routing tables of neighbors. In
contrast, PM malicious nodes are visible during the routing process because they processes
packets as normal nodes. The malicious node appears in routing tables of neighbors and
the hop-count (HC) value increases when control packets are routed. This attacks type can
be performed simply with on-demand routing protocols, typically the Ad hoc On-demand
Distance Vector (AODV [15]) routing protocol, the purpose is to be eavesdropping. [18]
Related works for detection the wormhole attacks have been published, such as WARP
[18], LBK [11], TIK [7], DelPHI [2], MHA [9], and TTHCA [10], all will be summarized in
Section 2. In Section 3, we propose the valid route testing mechanism using the distance and
routing cost parameters to examine the validity of discovered routes, and integrating VRTM
into route discovery algorithm of AODV protocol to create DWAODV protocol. Section
4 shows the evaluation and analysis result using NS2, comparing related works and our
approach results is also described in this section. Finally, conclusions and future works.
2. RELATED WORKS
The first, authors [18] described the WARP protocol using multi paths discovery (MPD)
solution, and selection of the greater path which helps the source node “avoid” the route
containing malicious nodes. The weakness of WARP is that it cannot work well in the
normal topology due to the discovered route has not the best cost. The selection of route
without best cost does not mean that route shall not contain the malicious nodes. The
second, authors [11] described a graph theoretic model to characterize the wormhole attack
and prevent wormholes. They used a local broadcast key (LBK) to install a secure Ad-
hoc Network against wormhole attacks. There are two types of nodes used: guards and
regular nodes. Guards nodes continuously broadcast location data containing the location
information through global positioning system (GPS) or some other localization method like
SeRLoc [12]. Regular nodes calculate their location relative to the guards’ beacons, thus
they can detect abnormal transmission due to data resent by the wormhole attackers. All
transmissions between node pairs are encrypted by the local broadcast key of the sending
end and decrypted at the receiving end. This approach is suitable for to the network with
immobilized topology such as wireless sensor networks. If topology has fast mobilized nodes
then this solution increases very large time delay and communication overhead based on
guards nodes continuously broadcast location data. The next, authors [7] propose TIK
protocol that can determine the wormhole attack. TIK uses packet leashes solution involving
appending information to a packet relating to either distance or time, to limit packet’s
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admissible transmission distance. Thus, the wormhole attack is detected because it passes
packets more faster than valid routes. TIK depends on precisely synchronized time between
all nodes, thus, the detection effectiveness is mitigated on the high speed mobilized nodes
topology. Furthermore, authors [2] described an advanced AODV solution allowing detecting
the wormhole attacks namely DelPHI. The idea is that the source node receives the reply
routes packet on many routes and calculates the delay of control packets through each node.
The delay time from the source node to destination node when a wormhole appears is longer
much than that of the normal route at the same cost, therefore, the node can detect the
attack. However, in the mobile topology at high speed, because the delay time of control
packet is influenced, the detection ability to malicious nodes is restricted. Furthermore,
authors [9] described MHA solution is a HC-based approach that does not require round trip
time (RTT) measurement. MHA modifies the AODV route discovery protocol to identify
several unique routes between the source and destination nodes. A route with a much
lower HC value than other routes is then assumed to include a wormhole and is avoided in
network communications. Finally, authors [10] presented a new robust wormhole detection
algorithm based on packet traversal time and hop count analysis (TTHCA) for the AODV
routing protocol. TTHCA provides wormhole detection performance with low mistake rates,
without incurring either significant computational or network cost. However, the TTHCA
detection ability to malicious nodes is restricted because the packet traversal time (PTT) is
influenced in the mobile topology at high speed.
In addition, some solutions apply mechanism of authentication, integrity, non-repudiation
based on digital signature, such as SAODV [13], ARAN [17]. SAODV protocol only supports
certification from end-to-end (EtE) without hop-by-hop (HbH), and ARAN is certified from
HbH and EtE. They have high security, prevent wormhole Participation Mode, but they are
failed by wormhole attacks in Hide Mode [8], and the very large cost for discovery route is
also disadvantages.
3. PROPOSING DWAODV PROTOCOL FOR SECURITY
This section describes the valid routes testing mechanism and integrating it into route
discovery algorithm of AODV protocol to create a new improved protocol named DWAODV.
3.1. Valid route testing mechanism (VRTM)
Based on the characteristics of wormhole attacks it uses a private tunnel connected
between two malicious nodes. Source nodes transfer route control packets on private tunnel
that appears the discovered routes with a lower cost than actual routes. Our solution to
define a route is valid or invalid based on distance between source and destination nodes
using node location and routing cost. In order to make the parameter to check a valid route
of VRTM, this article uses two definitions: Actual neighboring nodes and Valid routes.
3.1.1. Definitions
Definition 1. Two nodes (Ni and Nj) are actual neighboring nodes if they are under their
transmission radius. Hence, d(Ni, Nj) ≤ min(RNi, RNj), where, Rδ is maximum transmis-
sion radius of δ node, d(Ni, Nj) is Euclidean distance between Ni and Nj nodes, according to
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formula (1), triplet (xδ, yδ, zδ) is node δ location in coordinate system for a three-dimensional
space.
d(Ni, Nj) =
√
(xNi − xNj )2 + (yNi − yNj )2 + (zNi − zNj )2. (1)
Example 1. In network topology in Figure 1(a), N1 and N2 are actual neighbors because
distance between N1 and N2 nodes is less than (or equal to) transmission radius of two nodes.
N1
RN1
d(N1, N2)
N2
RN2
Distance (d) R
(a) Actual neighbors
Len(N1, Nn)
N1
RN1
d(N1, N2)
N2
RN2
NN3
RN3
Ni Nn−1
RNn−1
Nn
RNn
R Node Distance (d) Path length
(b) Valid route
Figure 1. Description of valid route
Definition 2. It is assumed that source code N1 discovers route to destination Nn on
direction {N1 → N2 → ... → Ni → Ni+1 → ... → Nn−1 → Nn}. This route is deemed as
valid if with any two nodes Ni and Ni+1, they must be the actual neighbors.
Example 2. Routes in network topology (Figure 1(b)) is valid route because with any two
nodes Ni and Ni+1, they are actual neighbors.
3.1.2. The parameter to check a valid route
If it is hypothesized that a valid route from source node (N1) to destination node (Nn),
then from Definition 2, we have
n−1∑
i=1
d(Ni, Ni+1) = len(N1, Nn). (2)
Because two nodes Ni and Nj are actual neighboring nodes, based on Definition 1 we
have
d(Ni, Ni+1) 6 min(RNi , RNi+1), ∀i = 1..n− 1. (3)
From (2) and (3), we have
n−1∑
i=1
min(RNi , RNi+1) > len(N1, Nn). (4)
Because all nodes are the same communication standard, then we have
RNi = RNi+1 = R,∀i = 1..n− 1. (5)
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From (4) and (5), we have
n−1∑
i=1
RNi > len(N1, Nn)⇔
n−1∑
i=1
RNi = HC ∗RNi > len(N1, Nn)
⇔ len(N1, Nn)
HC
6 RNi . (6)
From (5) and (6), where R is node’s maximum transmission radius, we have
len(N1, Nn)
HC
6 R. (7)
Hence, the valid route is the route that two nodes (Ni, Ni+1) are actual neighboring
nodes and the ratio of the lengths between source node (N1) and destination node (Nn) to
the routing cost must be less than (or equal to) the transmission radius of node.
3.1.3. VRTM contents
The valid route testing mechanism is shown in Figure 2, the source node (NS) initiates
packet (P), at the same time, records the location into GPS field before sending to the
destination node (ND). Intermediate nodes (Ni) checks the route which routed P packet, if
(th 6 R) and (d 6 R) then the P packet arrived on valid route, else the P packet arrived on
invalid route. Checking is repeated at all intermediate nodes until ND receives the P packet.
End
The route is valid The route is invalid
Ni is the
destination node
Immediate node updates its
location and Path length values for P;
Sends P to destination node;
n
y
(th 6 R) && (d 6 R)
y
n
th = len / HC;
HC = the routing cost from Ns to Ni;
d = distance (Ni, Nj); len = P.Pathlength + d;
Nj is node which routed P packet;
Ni is intermediate node which recieves P;
Source node localtion (NS) is inserted into
packet (P) before sending to destination ND;
Begin
Figure 2. Valid route testing mechanism
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In MANET, node location is not installed manually due to all random mobility nodes.
Our idea is to use GPS information to define nodes location similarly to authors in [3][14]. In
case there exists any node without GPS signal, our solution can not detect and prevent the
wormhole attacks. Hence, this node does not cooperate with the discover route processing
until GPS signal is ready.
3.2. Improved DWAODV routing protocol
The Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV [15]) uses the route exploration mech-
anism if it is necessary. If source node NS has no route to destination node ND then source
node starts route discovery process by broadcasting the route request packets (RREQ) and
receiving the route reply packets (RREP) from destination node. AODV protocol belongs
to routing group based on distance vector, the routing cost is therefore calculated based on
nodes from source NS to destination ND, this is hop count (HC) value in RREQ request
packet and RREP reply packet, HC value increases by 1 when packet is routed by nodes.
Destination node sends unicast RREP packet to reply a route when it receives RREQ packet,
or the intermediate nodes can reply RREP if there exists any “fresh” enough route to desti-
nation node ND. Each node keeps sequence number (SN) value to determine “freshness” of
recently explored route. Based on HC value and destination sequence number (DSN), source
node NS updates new route that newly explored route is “fresh” enough and cheapest to
destination.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Type JRGDU Reserved Hop Count| | |
RREQ ID
Destination IP Address
Destination Sequence Number
Source IP Address
Source Sequence Number
GPS (x , y)
Path length
(a) SecRREQ
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Type |RA| Reserved | Hop Count|Pre Sz
Destination IP Address
Destination Sequence Number
Source IP Address
Life time
GPS (x , y)
Path length
(b) SecRREP
Figure 3. Control packets in DWAODV protocol
The DWAODV protocol is proposed by integration of VRTM into AODV protocol at
the two phases: Broadcasting route request packet and unicasting route reply packet. The
structure of SecRREQ and SecRREP packets of DWAODV as Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b),
improved from RREQ and RREP packets of AODV. They are supplemented two new fields
named GPS and Path length, both of them are installed with 8 byte size for GPS field and
4 byte size for Path length field. The GPS field to record the geological location of node
which sent (or forward) the packet, and the Path length field to save the lengths of the path
delivering the packet.
3.2.1. Broadcasting route request packet in DWAODV
The Figure 4 describes the algorithm of route request packet broadcasting of DWAODV
protocol. To discover a new route to destination node ND, the source node NS initiates
the SecRREQ packet, and records the location into GPS field before broadcasting to all its
neighbor nodes.
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End
Sends SecRREP back to source node (NS)
Ni has fresh route to ND
n
y
Adds a reverse route to NS ;
SecRREQ.HC++;
SecRREQ.GPS = Ni localtion;
SecRREQ.Pathlength = len;
Broadcasts SecRREQ;
Ni is destination node
n
y
(th 6 R) and (d 6 R)
y
n BL[Nj ] = True;
Removes route for Nj node;
Ni = node receives SecRREQ;
d = distance (Ni, Nj);
len = SecRREQ.Pathlength + d;
th = len / HC;
BL[Nj]==True
n
y
Drops SecRREQ
Nj = node sent (or forwarded) SecRREQ
Inserts source address and broadcast id values into Cache
Ni received SecRREQ
n
y
Ni receives SecRREQ packet
Initializes SecRREQ packet;
SecRREQ.GPS = getGPS();
Broadcasts SecRREQ packet;
VRTM
Begin
Destination node ND
Source node NS
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e
d
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o
d
e
N
i
Figure 4. The route request algorithm of DWAODV
When receives the SecRREQ packet, the intermediate nodes Ni processes it as follows:
• If Ni had received the SecRREQ packet (using source address and broadcast id) then
Drops SecRREQ and The end;
• Ni inserts triple source address and broadcast id information into its Cache;
• Nj is the last hop which routed SecRREQ packet. If Nj is exists in Black List (BL)
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then the SecRREQ is dropped and The end;
• Ni uses VRTM to check the valid route. If the SecRREQ arrives in the invalid route
(th> R) or (d > R) then The SecRREQ packet is dropped; Ni inserts Nj into the its
BL; All entries to Nj are removed;
• Else,
– Ni adds a reverse route to source node into its RT;
– If Ni is the destination node or it has a fresh enough route to destination then
Ni sends the unicast SecRREP packet to reply a route for source through the Nj
next hop;
– Else, Ni increases the HC value in SecRREQ, both GPS and Path length fields
are updated, and broadcasts the SecRREQ packet for all its neighbors.
Example 3. See in Figure 5(a), N1 broadcasts the SecRREQ packet to destination node
N8 on route {N1 → N2 → N7 → N9 → N10 → N11 → N8}. Intermediate node (N2) uses
VRTM to check the valid route when it receives SecRREQ packet, N2 routes SecRREQ to N7
because of len(N1, N7)/1 = d(N1, N7) 6 R, the route from N1 to N2 is valid. Checking the
valid route is also performed at all other nodes including N7, N9, N10, N11 and N8. The result
is destination node N8 accepts the SecRREQ packet and sends unicast SecRREP packet to
reply source node because of (len(N1, N8)/6 6 R) and (d(N11, N8) 6 R), the route from N1
to N8 is valid.
RREQ RREP Node Ratio range
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
N6 N7 N8
N9 N10 N11
(a) Normal network topology
RREQ RREP Node Tunnel
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
N6 N7
N8
N9 N10 N11
M1
M2
(b) Wormhole attacks network topology
Figure 5. Discovery route of DWAODV protocol
However, in the network topology with wormhole attacks in Figure 5(b), N1 broadcasts
the SecRREQ packet to destination on route {N1 → M1 → M2 → N8}. Malicious nodes
(M1 and M2) forward the SecRREQ packet to N8 when it receives request route packets.
Destination node (N8) uses VRTM to check the valid route, the result is N8 drops the
SecRREQ because of len(N1, N8)/HC > R, the SecRREQ arrives on the invalid route,
where if malicious nodes in HM mode then HC = 1, else HC = 3. Figure 6 shows the detail
description of the processing to broadcast the SecRREQ packet using VRTM to check the
valid route.
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HC=1
HC=2
HC=3
HC=4
HC=5
HC=6
len(N1, N2)
len(N1, N7)
len(N1, N9)
len(N1, N10)
len(N1, N11)
len(N1, N8)
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
SecRREQ is acepted
N1 N2 N7 N9 N10 N11 N8
SecRREQ
SecRREQ
SecRREQ
SecRREQ
SecRREQ
SecRREQ
(a) Normal
HC=1
len(N1, N8)
d(M1, M2) >> R
InValid
SecRREQ is dropped
N1 M1 M2 N8
SecRREQ
SecRREQ
SecRREQ
(b) Under attacks
Figure 6. Description of the processing to broadcast the SecRREQ packet
3.2.2. Unicasting route reply packet in DWAODV
DWAODV uses the route reply algorithm is improved from route reply algorithm of
AODV protocol as described in Figure 7. A node generates a SecRREP packet if it is either
the destination (ND) or an intermediate (Ni) which has an “fresh” route to the destination.
It saves the location into GPS field before unicasting SecRREP back to source node. When
receives the SecRREP packet, the intermediate nodes Ni processes it as follows:
• Nj is the last hop which forwarded SecRREP packet;
• If Nj is exists in BL then SecRREP is dropped and The end;
• Ni uses VRTM to check the valid route. If the SecRREP packet arrives via invalid
route (th> R) or (d > R) then the SecRREP packet is dropped; Ni inserts Nj into the
its BL; All of the entry information to Nj is removed;
• Else,
– Ni adds a reverse route to destination node into its RT;
– If Ni is source node then Ni accepts SecRREP packet to install a new route;
– Else, Ni increases the HC value in SecRREP, both GPS and Length fields are
updated before unicasting the SecRREP back to source node if it a entry is found;
reversely, SecRREP is dropped.
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End
NS accepts SecRREP packet
Ni drops SecRREP
Ni is source node
n
y
Finds route to NS Is Found
n
y
(th 6 R) and (d 6 R)
y
nBL[Nj ] = True;
Removes route for Nj node;
Ni = node receives SecRREP;
d = distance (Ni, Nj);
len = SecRREP.Pathlength + d;
th = len / HC;
BL[Nj]==True
n
y
Drops SecRREP
Nj = node forwarded SecRREP
Ni receives SecRREP packet
Initializes SecRREP packet;
SecRREP.GPS = getGPS();
Replies SecRREP back to source node;
Ni saves a new route to ND;
SecRREP.HC++;
SecRREP.GPS = Ni localtion;
SecRREP.Pathlength = len;
Forwards SecRREP;
Begin
VRTM
Source node NS
Destination node ND
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r
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e
d
ia
te
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e
N
i
Figure 7. The route reply algorithm of DWAODV
Example 4. Figure 8(a) shows the detail description of the processing to reply SecRREP
for network topology in Figure 5(a). Node N8 replies the SecRREP packet back to source
on route {N8 → N11 → N10 → N9 → N7 → N2 → N1} when it receives the SecRREQ
packet. Intermediate node (N11) uses VRTM to check the valid route, SecRREP packet is
routed to N10 because of len(N8, N11)/1 = d(N8, N11) 6 R, the route from N8 to N11 is valid.
Similarly, nodeN10 also forwards the SecRREP packet toN9 because of (len(N8, N10)/2 6 R)
and (d(N10, N11) 6 R), the route from N8 to N10 is valid. Checking valid route is also
performed at N9, N7, N2 and N1. The result is N1 accepts the SecRREP packet because of
(len(N8, N1)/6 6 R) and (d(N1, N2) 6 R), the route between N8 and N1 is valid.
However, in the network topology with wormhole attacks at Figure 5(b), N8 sends the
unicast packet SecRREP back to source on route {N8 →M2 →M1 → N1}. Malicious nodes
(M2 and M1) forward the SecRREP packet to N1 when it receives reply route packets. Source
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len(N11, N8)
len(N10, N8)
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len(N2, N8)
len(N1, N8)
Valid
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SecRREP is acepted
N1 N2 N7 N9 N10 N11 N8
SecRREP
SecRREP
SecRREP
SecRREP
SecRREP
SecRREP
(a) Normal
HC=1
len(N1, N8)
d(M1, M2) >> R
InValid
SecRREP is dropped
N1 M1 M2 N8
SecRREP
SecRREP
SecRREP
(b) Under attacks
Figure 8. Description of the processing to unicast the SecRREP packet
node (N1) uses VRTM to check the valid route when it receives the SecRREP packet, the
result is N1 drops the SecRREQ packet because of len(N1, N8)/HC > R, the SecRREP
arrives on the invalid route. Where if malicious nodes in HM then HC = 1, else HC =
3. Figure 8(b) shows the detailed description of the processing to unicast SecRREP using
VRTM to check the valid route.
4. EVALUATE THE RESULT OF SIMULATION
This section presents the result of assessment on damage caused by wormhole attacks
in the AODV protocol, the efficiency of DWAODV protocol based on the simulation on
NS2 [4]. The source code for wormhole attacks on MANET is shared by the authors [1] at
https://web.njit.edu. Source code DWAODV protocol which is upgraded from the source
code of AODV protocol available on NS2 at the folder root/ns-allinone-2.35/ns-2.35.
4.1. Simulation parameters
We evaluate the security efficiency of our solution on simulation software NS2 (version
2.35). Similar parameters to those in [10] are used, the network topology is available with
300 normal nodes and 2 malicious nodes, and our simulation network operated in the area of
2000m × 2000m (4mil m2), mobility nodes under Random Way Point (RWP [19]), created
by ./setdest tool. Malicious nodes are located at the center with n hops length tunnel (n =
3, 4, 5, and 6), and wormhole attacks behavior started eavesdropping at second 0; Simulation
protocols are AODV and DWAODV, 600 seconds simulation times; the maximum radio range
of node (R) is 250m, FIFO queue, 10 UDP connection, CBR traffic type, packet capacity of
512bytes, the first data source is started at second 0, the following data source is 5 seconds
apart from each node; the detail of simulation parameters is listed in the following Table 1.
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Table 1. Simulation parameters
Parameters Setting
Simulation times (s) 600
Number of nodes 302 (2 malicious nodes)
Wormhole type OB
Attacks modes HM, PM
Wireless standard IEEE 802.11
Maximum radio range (m) 250
Mobility model RWP or Immobile
Maximum mobility speed (m/s) 20
Number of connection 10 UDP
Traffic type CBR (Constant Bit Rate)
Packet size (bytes) 512
Queue type FIFO (DropTail)
Routing protocols AODV, DWAODV
To evaluate the impact of wormhole attack and efficiency of DWAODV protocol to detect
attacks, we use some evaluation metrics such as: The ratio of invalid route (IR) is detected,
the ratio of packets are routed (RPR) by malicious node, the average length of each discov-
ered routing path (ALR). The packet delivery ratio (PDR), PDR = (the number of packets
delivered successfully / the total number of packets from source) × 100. Network throughput
(NT) is amount of data transferred from source to destination in a given amount of time (1
second), NT = (Total number of successfully delivered packets × Packet size) / Simulation
times. Routing load (RL [17]) is the total of control packet overhead to deliver a data packet
to destination node successfully, RL = the total number of control packets overhead / the
total number of the received data packets.
4.2. Simulation results
After performing 600s for simulation of AODV and DWAODV protocols in the attacked
and normal network topology. The simulation results is shown in the Figures 9 and 10.
4.2.1. Detection efficiency for wormhole attacks
The simulation results in Figure 9(a) shows that our approach has the successful detection
ratio of IR over 99% for all scenarios. For TTHCA, Figure 9(b) shows this ratio is fallen
to below 99% due to the wormhole attacks PM mode having short tunnel (< 6 hops) which
makes the wormhole routes particularly difficult to discern from a healthy route (see more
in authors [10], Figure 7). Thus, we may confirm that VRTM outperformed TTHCA for all
wormhole lengths less than 6 hops with PM mode.
Figure 9(c) shows that malicious node attacked AODV routing protocol successfully,
hence, there are more than 50% data packets are routed to destination nodes through mali-
cious nodes. For similar scenarios, VRTM has very good detection efficiency for wormhole
attacks, hence, there are lower than 0.1% data packets are routed by malicious node. Figure
9(d) shows that in network topology under attacks, the average length per each discovered
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Figure 9. The simulation results in topology under wormhole attacks
route of AODV protocol is 4.622 hops in PM modes (4.617 hops in HM modes), lower than
0.299 hops in PM modes (0.304 hops in HM modes) when comparing with AODV in nor-
mal network topology. Because AODV discovers routes which contain the wormhole tunnel,
their costs are lower than usual routes. For DWAODV, simulation results show that the av-
erage length of discovered routes is 4.986 hops approximately AODV (4.921 hops) in normal
network topology (see in Figure 10(a)).
4.2.2. Comparing DWAODV and AODV in normal network topology
Figure 10(a) shows that DWAODV protocol discovers the routes which has the cost
approximately AODV in the mobile topology at high speed. DWAODV protocol has the
average cost for each route as 4.939 hops that is 0.018 larger than AODV (4.921 hops).
Figure 10(b) shows that PDR of DWAODV protocol is 78.857% that is 0.294% lower than
AODV’s (79.152%). PDR of DWAODV is less than to AODV in normal network topology due
to two reasons: (1) Security solution limited discover route effective of DWAODV protocol
(2) The average cost for each route discovered of DWAODV protocol is larger than AODV’s,
therefore, the time to route data packets to destination node shall be larger.
Figure 10(c) shows that the network throughput of DWAODV is 31,088.64 bps, 116.05
bps higher than AODV’s (31,204.69 bps) due to the PDR of DWAODV protocol is lower than
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Figure 10. The simulation results in normal network topology
AODV’s. Figure 10(d) shows that the routing load of DWAODV is 88.63 packets that is 0.86
packet lower than AODV’s (89.49 packets). The season is VRTM can appear mistakes when
checking the route request packet SecRREQ in mobility scenarios at high speed, reduced
communication overhead due to a small number of SecRREQ shall be dropped.
4.2.3. Comparing related works and our approach
We compare our approach with previous works in Table 2. TIK, DelPHI and TTHCA
algorithms to detect malicious nodes depending on round trip time or packet traversal time,
hence detection ability is influenced largely by mobility speed and tunnel length. In contrast,
our solution performance is affected slightly by mobility speed and tunnel length because of
the VRTM using the distance and routing cost to detect the wormhole attack without round
trip time or packet traversal time. For LBK solution, nodes continuously broadcast location
data is the location information using the GPS information, all transmissions between node
pairs is encrypted by the local broadcast key of the sending end and decrypted at the receiving
end; and TIK solution depends on precisely synchronized time between all nodes, thus both
solutions have high communication overhead (See in [9], Table 3). Our solution uses low
communication overhead because the processing to discover route is similar to that of the
original protocol, and without new control packets.
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Table 2. Our approach and related works
Method Network Based on Control packets Overhead
Performance is affected by
Mobility speed Tunnel lengh
WARP [18] MANET MPD Modified Low Small Small
LBK [11] WSN GPS, Encryption Added High Large Small
TIK [7] MANET Distance, Time Modified High Large Large
DelPHI [2] MANET RTT, HC Unchanged Low Large Large
MHA [9] MANET HC Modified Low Large Small
TTHCA [10] MANET PTT, HC Modified Low Large Large
VRTM MANET Distance, HC Modified Low Small Small
5. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a valid route testing mechanism for routing security and a new improved
protocol named DWAODV. Our solution uses the distance and hop count metrics to detect
wormhole attacks, thus it has proven to be effective with low measurement mistakes in the
high mobility network topology under attacks. The simulation results show that our solution
is capable of detecting successfully over 99% of invalid routes, and small dependence on tunnel
length. In addition, in the normal network topology, the routing performance of DWAODV
is approximately AODV based on the metrics including the average length of each discovered
routing path, packet delivery ratio, network throughput and routing load. However, packet
deliver ratio of DWAODV is less than that of AODV in normal network topology because
it is designed to work in unsafe network topology. Addition, VRTM requires all mobile
nodes with GPS modules ready and maybe mistake is appears if GPS signals are poor or
inaccurate.
In the future, important problem for the VRTM algorithm is to ensure the integrity and
accuracy of the control packet. It is feasible that a PM mode wormhole node can deliberately
give fake information concerning GPS and Path length fields.
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